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Abstract
When modelling cryto-protocols by means of process calculi which express both nondeterministic and prob-
abilistic behavior, it is customary to view the scheduler as an intruder. It has been established that the
traditional scheduler needs to be carefully calibrated in order to more accurately reﬂect the intruder’s capa-
bilities for controlling communication channels. We propose such a class of schedulers through a semantic
variant called PPCνσ , of the Probabilistic Poly-time Calculus (PPC) of Mitchell et al. [11] and we illustrate
the pertinence of our approach by an extensive study of the Dining Cryptographers (DCP) [8] protocol.
Along these lines, we deﬁne a new characterization of Mitchell et al.’s observational equivalence [11] more
suited for taking into account any observable trace instead of just a single action as required in the analysis
of the DCP.
Keywords: Process algebra, observational equivalence, probabilistic scheduling, analysis of cryptographic
protocols
1 Introduction
Systems that combine both probabilities and nondeterminism are very convenient
for modelling probabilistic security protocols. In order to model such systems, some
eﬀorts have been taken to extend (possibilistic) models based on process algebras
such as either the π-calculus or the CSP, by including probabilities. One can dis-
tinguish two classes of such models. On one hand, we have all purpose probabilistic
models adding probabilities to nondeterministic models [1,6,3]. On the other hand,
we have process algebraic frameworks that deﬁne probabilistic models in order to
make them more suitable for applications in security protocols [11,4,10].
While it is customary to use schedulers for resolving non-determinism in proba-
bilistic systems, scheduling processes must be carefully designed in order to reﬂect
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as accurately as possible the intruder’s capabilities for controlling the communica-
tion network without controlling the internal reactions of the system. Consider the
protocol c(a).0|c(b).0 transmitting the messages a and b over c and the intruder
c(x).0 eavesdropping on this channel. As the protocol is purely non deterministic,
the probability of the intercepted message being either a or b should be the same.
A scheduler that could assign an arbitrary probabilistic distribution to these two
messages could also force the protocol to transmit either a or b. Such schedulers
are too strong however, and should therefore not be admissible. But restricting the
power of schedulers should also be carefully done, otherwise this could result in ad-
versaries that are too weak. Forcing schedulers to give priority to internal actions,
for example, makes internal actions completely invisible to attackers. An intruder
is then unable to distinguish a process P from another process which could do some
internal action, and then behaves like P . Consider now the following process:
P = νc′(c(x).c′(x).0|c′(1).0|c′(y).[y = 0]c(secret).0).
In this obviously unsecure protocol, an intruder could send 0 to P over c and thus
allow P to publish the secret. Such a ﬂaw will never be detected in semantics giving
priority to internal actions, since in that case P will never broadcast secret on public
channel c.
Contribution. Our contribution is threefold. Firstly, we deﬁne a semantic variant
of the Probabilistic Polynomial-time Process Calculus PPC [11] (Section 2), called
PPCνσ, to cope with the problem of characterizing the intruders’s capacity. Con-
trary to most probabilistic models, our operational semantics does not normalize
probabilities. The reason is that normalizing has the eﬀect of removing control of
its own actions from the intruder. Consider the process P = c(m).Q1|c(m).Q2 :
depending on whether P represents a protocol or an intruder, the scheduling of a
component is respectively equiprobable or arbitrarily chosen by the intruder. A
solution might be to discriminate semantically between a protocol and an intruder,
but this rapidly becomes rather intricate since synchronization actions could be
committed by both. We propose here a simpler solution to this problem. It consists
of equipping the intruder with an attack strategy i.e., a selection process called
external scheduler (Section 2.3), allowing it to choose the next action to perform at
each evaluation step. This scheduling is carefully designed to reﬂect as accurately
as possible the intruder’s real capacities, i.e. to control the communication network
without controlling internal reactions of the system under its stimuli.
Secondly, we reformulate (Section 3) the observational equivalence of [11] into
a more amenable form to take account of all observable traces instead only single
step.
Finally, to illustrate the pertinence of our approach, we conclude the paper by an
extensive case study (Section 4): the analysis of the Chaum’s Dining Cryptographers
protocol [8]. We give a probabilistic version of the possibilistic speciﬁcation of
the anonymity property as per Schneider and Sidiropoulos [12], and prove that
restricting the scheduler’s power too much may lead to very weak models which
cannot detect ﬂawed speciﬁcations of the protocol.
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Related work. The technical precursor of our framework is the process calculus
of Mitchell et al. [11]. Though any of the models [1,6,3,11,4,10] or any similar
framework could have been an interesting starting point, the framework of Mitchell
et al. [11] appears appropriate for the following reasons. Although it is a formal
model, it is still close to computational setting of modern cryptography since it
works directly on the cryptographic level. Indeed it deﬁnes an extension of the
CCS process algebra with ﬁnite replication and probabilistic polynomial-time terms
denoting cryptographic primitives. It turns out that these probabilistic polynomial
functions are useful for modelling the probabilistic behaviour of security systems.
Unlike formalisms such as [6,4,10], the scheduling is probabilistic, better reﬂecting
so the ability of the attacker to control the communication network. Finally it also
appears as a natural formal framework for capturing and reasoning about a variety
of fundamental cryptographic notions.
The problem of characterizing the schedulers’ capacities has recently been con-
sidered in [5,7,9]. In [5] the authors treated the problem of overly powerful schedulers
in the context of systems modelled in a Probabilistic I/O Automata framework.
They restricted the scheduler by deﬁning two levels of schedulers. A high-level
scheduler called adversarial scheduler is a component of the system and controls
the communication network, i.e. it schedules public channels. This component has
limited knowledge of the behaviour of other components in the system: their in-
ternal choices and secret information are hidden. On the other hand, a low-level
scheduler called tasks scheduler resolves the remaining non-determinism by a task
schedule. These tasks are equivalence classes of actions that are independent of the
high-level scheduler choices. We believe that these tasks may correspond to our
“strategically equivalent action”.
In Garcia et. al. [9] a dual problem to the one we have considered here, namely
the problem that arises when traditional schedulers are overly powerful, is addressed.
In the context of security protocols modelled by probabilistic automata, they deﬁne
a probabilistic scheduler that assign, in the current state, a probability distribu-
tion on the possible non-deterministic next transitions. Unlike our scheduler, it is
history-dependent since it deﬁnes equiprobable paths and it is not stochastic, and
might therefore halt execution at any time. Roughly speaking, admissible sched-
ulers are deﬁned w.r.t bisimulation equivalence: any observably trace equivalent
paths are equiprobably scheduled and lead to bisimilar states.
Another recent paper on the scheduling issue is presented in [7]. Unlike our
scheduler and that of [9] which are both deﬁned on the semantic level, [7] proposes
a framework in which schedulers are deﬁned and controlled on the syntactic level.
They make random choices in the protocol invisible to the adversary. Note that we
achieve the same goal by using the operational semantics Eval rule which reduces
unblocked processes, as well as our strategically equivalent classes of actions. More
investigation is needed for papers [5,7] to determine how the approaches may beneﬁt
from each other.
Finally an alternate approach is proposed in [4,10]. Instead of scheduling a
single action (like ours), or a path (like the one of [9]), a process is scheduled. The
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problems of discriminating between a protocol’s actions and intruder’s ones, and the
privileging of internal actions, is meaningless in these models because scheduling
is included implicitly in the speciﬁcation. In other words, the protocol designer
determines when control passes from the protocol to the attacker. Let us explain
this last point. Consider the protocol P = ν(c)(c(1).|c(x).c′(0).) which, after an
internal communication, outputs 0 on the public channel c′. In the frameworks of
[4,10], it may be speciﬁed in two diﬀerent manners
P1 = ν(c)(start().c(1).0|c(x).c′(0).0)
and
P2 = ν(c)(start().c(1).0|c(x).contr2Intr().getContr().c′(0).0)
depending on whether or not we want to make the internal action completely in-
visible to the attacker. In this way the user has total freedom and can eliminate
undesirable schedulers at the speciﬁcation level. The drawback is that the protocol
designer who has incomplete knowledge about the system, may specify his intuition
of the protocol and so get some properties that might not be satisﬁed by the actual
protocol.
2 The PPCνσ model
The process algebra PPCνσ extends semantically the Probabilistic Polynomial-time
Process Calculus PPC [11] to better take into account the analysis of probabilistic
security protocols.
2.1 Syntax of PPCνσ
Terms. The set of terms T of the process algebra PPCνσ consists of variables V,
numbers N, pairs, and a speciﬁc term N standing for the security parameter. The
security parameter may be understood as the cryptographic primitives’ key length
and may appear in the probabilistic polynomial functions deﬁned below. Formally
we have
t ::= n (integer ) | x (variable) | N (secur. param.) | (t, t) (pair )
For each term t, fv(t) is the set of variables in t. A message is a closed term (i.e.
not containing variables). The set of messages is denoted M.
Functions. The call of probabilistic as well as deterministic cryptographic primi-
tives, such as keys and nonces generation, encryption, decryption, etc., is modelled
by probabilistic polynomial functions 2 Λ : Mk →M satisfying
∀(m1, . . . ,mk) ∈M
k, ∀m ∈M, ∀λ ∈ Λ, ∃p ∈ [0, 1] such that
Prob[λ(m1, · · · ,mk) = m] = p.
We denote λ(m1, · · · ,mk) ↪→ x the assignment of the value λ(m1, · · · ,mk) to
the variable x and by λ(m1, · · · ,mk)
p
↪→ m if λ(m1, · · · ,mk) evaluates to m with
2 See Appendix A for a formal deﬁnition of a probabilistic polynomial function
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probability p. From Deﬁnition A.1 (see Appendix A), the set
Im(λ(m1, · · · ,mk)) = {m | ∃p ∈]0..1] λ(m1, · · · ,mk)
p
↪→ m}
of m s.t. λ(m1, · · · ,mk) evaluates to m with non-zero probability, is a ﬁnite set.
For instance, RSA encryption which takes as parameters, a message m to encrypt
and an encryption key formed of the pair (e, n), and returns the number me mod n,
is the function λRSA(m, e, n) returning c with probability 1 if c = m
e mod n, and
0 otherwise. Similarly, we can model the key guessing attack of a cryptosystem by
the product [rand(1k) ↪→ key][dec(c, key) ↪→ x] where 1k is the size of the key
randomly generated by the function rand, and the decryption function dec returns
m with probability 1 if c is the cryptogram of m encrypted by k and key = k. The
success of such an attack has probability p = 1
2|k|
. These few examples illustrate the
expressive power oﬀered by these functions. We limit ourselves to the probabilistic
polynomial ones in order to model all attacks realizable (in the model) in polynomial
time.
Processes. Let C be a countable set of public channels. We assume that each
channel is equipped with a bandwidth given by the polynomial function bw : C −→
N. We say that a message m belongs to the domain of a channel c, written m ∈
dom(c), if the message length |m| is less than or equal to the channel bandwidth,
i.e. m ∈ dom(c) ⇐⇒ |m| ≤ bw(c). Note that |(m,m′)| = |m| + |m′| + r where r
is the length of a ﬁxed bits string, which allows us to concatenate and decompose
two terms without any ambiguity.
Processes in PPCνσ are built as follows :
P ::= 0 | c(x).P | c(m).P | P |P | (νc)P | [t = t]P |
| !q(N)P | [λ(t1, · · · , tn) ↪→ x]P
Given a process P , the set fv(P ) of free variables, is the set of variables x in P which
are not in the scope of any preﬁx either input (of the form c(x)) or probabilistic
evaluation (of the form [λ(t1, · · · , tn) ↪→ x]). A process without free variables
is called closed and the set of closed processes is denoted by Proc. Hereafter, all
processes are considered closed.
The mechanisms for reading, emitting, parallel composition, restriction and mat-
ching are all standard. The ﬁnite replication !q(N)P is the q(N)−fold parallel com-
position of P with itself, where q is a polynomial function. The novelty is the call
and return of probabilistic polynomial functions
[λ(t1, · · · , tn) ↪→ x]P
This feature allows to model (probabilistic) polynomial cryptographic primitives as
well as the probabilistic character of a protocol. In fact it is the main source of
probability in this model.
The following examples illustrate the way PPCνσ can be used to model protocols.
Example 2.1 Let Kgen be a (probabilistic) polynomial function that, given the
security parameter N, generates a secret encryption key and enc a (probabilistic)
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encryption function that, given a secret key K and a message M , returns the cryp-
togram of M under K. The process P that receives a message over the public
channel c generates an encryption key and returns the cryptogram of this message
over the same public channel. This is modeled in PPCνσ as follows:
P := c(x).[Kgen(N) ↪→ y][enc(x, y) ↪→ z]c(z).0
Example 2.2 Though that the calculus does not consider the probabilistic alter-
native choice operator “+”, it is possible to simulate it by means of the parallel
composition operator and some special probabilistic functions.
Let flips be a probabilistic polynomial function that given a coin return Head
with probability p and Tail with probability 1− p. Then the process Q that ﬂips a
coin and then behaves as the process Q′ if the result of coin ﬂipping is Head and
as the process Q′′ otherwise, is modeled in our calculus as follows:
Q := [flips(coin) ↪→ x]([x = Head]Q′|[x = Tail]Q′′)
2.2 Operational semantics
The set of actions
Act = {c(m), c(m), c(m) · c(m), c(m) · c(m), τ | m ∈M and c ∈ C}
consists of the set of partial input and output actions, of the set of synchronization
actions on public channels, and of the internal action τ :
Partial = {c(m), c(m) | m ∈M and c ∈ C}
Actual = {c(m) · c(m), c(m) · c(m), τ | m ∈M and c ∈ C}
The set of observable actions is given by Vis = Act−{τ}. The operational semantics
of PPCνσ is a probabilistic transition system (E ,T , E0) generated by the inference
rules given in Table 1 where E ⊆ Proc is the set of states, T ⊆ E ×Act× [0, 1] × E
the set of transitions and E0 ∈ Proc the initial state. The notation P
α[p]
−→P ′ stands
for (P,α, p, P ′) ∈ T . It is an extension of the CCS semantics, with a mechanism for
calling probabilistic polynomial functions. We sketch it brieﬂy here.
To make sure that internal computations of functions do not interfere with com-
munication actions (in particular with those on public channels controlled by the
intruder), all exposed functions in a process (Eval rule) are simultaneously eval-
uated by the probabilistic polynomial function eval deﬁned in Table 2 below as
illustrated in Example 2.3. This evaluation step allows us to get what we call a
blocked process, i.e. a process having no more internal computations to perform.
The set of blocked processes is denoted by Blocked .
Example 2.3 If processes Q′ and Q′′ of Example 2.2 are blocked processes then Q
reduces to Q′ with probability p and to Q′′ with probability 1− p. In other words,
Prob[eval(Q) = Q′] = p and Prob[eval (Q) = Q′′] = 1− p.
The output mechanism allows a principal A to send a message on public channels
(Output rule). Dually, the input mechanism must be ready to receive any message
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Eval.
eval(P )
p
↪→P ′ P ∈Blocked
P
τ [p]
−→P ′
Output
m ∈ dom(c)
c(m).P
c(m)[1]
−→ P
ParL.
P1
α[p]
−→P ′1 (P1|P2)∈Blocked
P1|P2
α[p]
−→P ′1|P2
SyncL.
P1
c(m)[p1]
−→ P ′1 P2
c(m)[p2]
−→ P ′2
P1|P2
c(m).c(m)[p1.p2]
−→ P ′1|P ′2
RestCL.
P
c(m).c(m)[p]
−→ P ′
(νc)P
τ [p]
−→(νc)P ′
Input
m ∈ dom(c)
c(x).P
c(m)[1]
−→ P [m/x]
ParR.
P2
α[p]
−→P ′2 (P1|P2)∈Blocked
P1|P2
α[p]
−→P1|P ′2
SyncR.
P1
c(m)[p1]
−→ P ′1 P2
c(m)[p2]
−→ P ′2
P1|P2
c(m).c(m)[p1.p2]
−→ P ′1|P ′2
RestCR.
P
c(m).c(m)[p]
−→ P ′
(νc)P
τ [p]
−→(νc)P ′
Rest
P
α[p]
−→P ′ α∈{c(m),c(m),c(m)·c(m),c(m)·c(m):m∈M} P∈Blocked
(νc)P
α[p]
−→(νc)P ′
Table 1
Operational semantics of PPCνσ
Prob[eval(0) = 0] = 1
Prob[eval(c(x).P ) = c(x).P ] = 1 and Prob[eval(c(m).P ) = c(m).P ] = 1
Prob[eval((νc)P ) = (νc)Q] = Prob[eval(P ) = Q](
Prob[eval([m = m′]P ) = Q] = Prob[eval(P ) = Q] if m = m′
Prob[eval([m = m′]P ) = 0] = 1 else
Prob[eval(P |Q) = P ′|Q′] = Prob[eval(P ) = P ′]× Prob[eval(Q) = Q′]
Prob[eval([λ(m1, · · · ,mk) ↪→ x]P ) = Q] =P
m∈Im(λ(m1,··· ,mk))
Prob[λ(m1, · · · ,mk) = m]× Prob[eval(P [m/x]) = Q]
Table 2
Reduction of unblocked processes
on a public channel (Input rule). The parallelism (Par. rules) operator is deﬁned
as usual. It is worth noting that the semantics keep track of information involved in
an interaction (the message and the communication channel) (Syn. rules), contrary
to most process algebra semantics where this information is lost, as the only action
resulting from such a communication is usually the invisible action τ . The restriction
operator ν is used to model private channels. The process (νc)P behaves like P
restricted to actions not on c unless a synchronization occurs on c (i.e. actions of
the form c(m) · c(m) or c(m) · c(m)). In this case, they are observed as an invisible
action τ (Rest. rules).
Note that, transition systems generated by the operational semantics (Table 1)
of PPCνσ processes, are not purely probabilistic. Consider for example process P =
c1(a)|c2(b). Clearly, the sum of probabilities of outgoing transitions of P , is equal
to 2. This is due to the parallel composition which introduces nondeterminism. In
order to resolve this nondeterminism it is mandatory to schedule, at each evaluation
step of the process, all available distinct actions. However, security protocols are
assumed to be executed in hostile environments, i.e. environments with external
intruders having full control of the communication network, with the ability to assign
any probabilistic distribution to the controlled channels (to the public actions). This
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is modelled by putting public actions under control of an external scheduler. Since
we do not want to deﬁne a particular attack strategy, the scheduling is not included
in the semantics of processes, but rather in the intruder’s deﬁnition: the intruder
is then formed by the pair (Π, S) of process Π and scheduler S. One may view the
hostile environment as Π interacting with the protocol, and S as its attack strategy.
2.3 External Scheduler
Given a protocol P attacked by the intruder (Π, S), evaluation of P |Π along the
strategy S is a four step process consisting of:
Reduction: evaluation of all exposed probabilistic functions in P |Π.
Localization: indexing of executable actions along eval(P |Π) to discriminate whether
or not an executable action interferes with an intruder’s action.
Selection: scheduling 3 S among available actions.
Execution: the action chosen by S is executed and the process is repeated until
there are no more executable actions.
Localization. Scheduling should be capable of determining whether or not the in-
truder is attached to an action. Since a system P attacked by the intruder Π is
simply modelled by P |Π, actions are indexed by the positions of the components
they belong to, e.g. if P and Π have respectively n and k parallel components, then
P |Π consists of n+ k components. By convention the attacker is on the right side,
so that actions indexed by integers less than or equal to n belong to the protocol
while those indexed by integers greater than n belong to the intruder. A partial
action is indexed with an integer denoting the component to which it belongs, while
a communication action is indexed by a pair of integers denoting the components
to which complementary partial actions belong.
Let Index = N∪N2 and the function support : Act \ {τ} → C where support(α)
is the name of the channel where α occurred.
Deﬁnition 2.4 The localization function χ : Blocked −→ 2Act×Index is deﬁned
recursively as follows:
χ(0) = ∅
χ(α.P ) = {(α, 1)}
χ(P |Q) = χ(P ) ∪ {(α, ρ(P ) + i) | (α, i) ∈ χ(Q)}
∪{(α · α, i, ρ(P ) + j) | (α, i) ∈ χ(Q) and (α, j) ∈ χ(Q)}
χ((νc)P ) = {(τ, i, j) | (α · α, i, j) ∈ χ(P ) and support(α) = c}
∪{(τ, k, l) | (τ, k, l) ∈ χ(P )}
where α ∈ Partial , max(i, (j, k)) = max(i, j, k). and
ρ(P ) =
(
max{ID ∈ Index | (β, ID) ∈ χ(P ), β ∈ Vis} if χ(P ) = ∅
0 otherwise
3 Note that scheduling is deﬁned only for blocked processes. In fact, the only action available to an
unblocked process is the internal action corresponding to functions evaluation.
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Selection. The function χ allows for action localization, but more guidelines are
needed to know whether or not an indexed action interferes with an intruder’s com-
ponents. Actually, a partition of the set of indexed actions into classes of strategi-
cally equiprobable actions, i.e. classes of actions uniformly chosen in a strategy S, is
needed. Intuitively, a class corresponds to actions which can not be distinguished by
any scheduler. The construction of the quotient set must agree with the following
principles:
(1) No strategy distinguishes between internal actions of a protocol.
(2) No strategy allows the intruder to control internal reactions of a protocol P to
any external stimulus. So, if P can react in many positions to a stimulus of
the intruder, then all these positions should have the same probability to react
to the intruder’s request.
(3) In any strategy, the intruder has complete control on its own actions.
Given a protocol P and an attacker Π, we use χ to compute two sets I1 and I2
s.t. indices corresponding to the protocol’s components belong to I1 and those
corresponding to the intruder’s ones belong to I2. Formally:
I1 =
(
{1, 2, · · · , ρ(eval(P ))} if χ(eval(P )) = ∅
∅ otherwise
I2 =
(
{ρ(eval(P )) + 1, · · · , ρ(eval(P )) + ρ(eval(Π))} if χ(eval(Π)) = ∅
∅ otherwise
Example 2.5 Let P = c(m).P1|c(m
′).P2 et Π = c(x).Π
′ then χ(eval(P |Π)) is the
set
{(c(m), 1), (c(m′), 2), (c(m), 3), (c(m′), 3), (c(m) · c(m), 1, 3), (c(m′) · c(m′), 2, 3)}
and so, I1 = {1, 2} et I2 = {3}.
The quotient set of strategically equiprobable actions is summarized in Table 3
where [(α, ID)]I1×I2 denotes the equiprobable class of the indexed action (α, ID)
w.r.t. sets I1 and I2. Let us brieﬂy describe these classes.
Due to principle (1), internal actions of P are equiprobable: it is reﬂected in
the deﬁnition of [(τ, i, j)]I1×I2; τ actions indexed by the components positions of
P (i.e. in I1) are equivalent. Otherwise [(τ, i, j)]I1×I2 is reduced to itself w.r.t (3).
Due to principle (2), partial outputs on a given public channel are equiprobable:
although the intruder can choose the public channel to spy on, it has no control
of messages transmitted on it. Otherwise [(c(m), i)] is reduced to itself: being an
intruder’s action, it can choose both the message and the component to build its
attack. Partial input is the dual case of partial output, with, by contrast, the
intruder controlling the message (sent by itself) that is received by P . The same
principles apply to public synchronization. The intruder can choose a listening
channel c and act merely as an observer, then any communication on c takes place
between two components of P . It has no control on either the messages exchanged,
nor on components where communication occurs. However, if communication arises
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[(τ, i, j)]I1×I2 =
(
{(τ, i′, j′) | i′, j′ ∈ I1} if i, j ∈ I1
{(τ, i, j)} otherwise
[(c(m), i)]I1×I2 =
(
{(c(m′), i′) | i′ ∈ I1, m′ ∈ dom(c)} if i ∈ I1
{(c(m), i)} otherwise
[(c(m), i)]I1×I2 =
(
{(c(m), j) | j ∈ I1} if i ∈ I1
{(c(m), i)} otherwise
[(c(m)c(m), i, j)]I1×I2 =8><
>:
{(αα, i′, j′) | i′, j′ ∈ I1, support(α) = c} if i, j ∈ I1
{(c(m′)c(m′), i′, j) | i′ ∈ I1,m′ ∈ dom(c)} if i ∈ I1, j ∈ I2
{(c(m)c(m), i, j)} otherwise
[(c(m)c(m), i, j)]I1×I2 =8><
>:
{(αα, i′, j′) | i′, j′ ∈ I1, support(α) = c} if i, j ∈ I1
{(c(m)c(m), i′, j) | i′ ∈ I1} if i ∈ I1, j ∈ I2
{(c(m)c(m), i, j)} otherwise
Table 3
Strategically equiprobable actions
from the protocol (output) to the intruder (input), then the intruder can select the
channel and its (input) component. For synchronization arising in the opposite
direction, the intruder can select not only the channel but also the message and its
output component as well. Finally, if communication arises between two components
of the intruder, then the intruder controls everything.
Deﬁnition 2.6 [External scheduler] An external scheduler is a stochastic polyno-
mial probabilistic function S : 2Act×Index × 2N× 2N → Act×Index s.t. for any non
empty set A ⊆ Act× Index and any pair of sets I1, I2 ⊆ N (with I1 = ∅ or I2 = ∅)
satisfying ∀(i1,i2)∈I1×I2i1 < i2, the following holds:
(i)
∑
(τ,i,j)∈A,i,j∈I1
Prob[S(A, I1, I2) = (τ, i, j)] ∈ {0, 1}.
(ii) ∀α,β∈Aα ∈ [β]I1×I2 ⇒ Prob[S(A, I1, I2) = α] = Prob[S(A, I1, I2) = β].
The set of schedulers is denoted by Sched 4 .
From the stochasticity condition (being itself a progress condition since it states that
at each step of the process at least one of the executable actions will be scheduled),
we have the following result:
Lemma 2.7 Let P be a process s.t. A = χ(eval(P )) = ∅ then the following holds:
∀S∈Sched∃α∈AProb[S(A) = α] = 0.
Our main result on schedulers follows.
Theorem 2.8 The sum of probabilities of outgoing transitions in any state along
any external scheduler is smaller than or equal to 1.
Proof. Let P be a process and Exec(P ) the set of outgoing transitions of P . Two
cases follow:
4 Given a protocol P and an intruder (Π, S), we know how to compute I1 et I2 induced from A = χ(P |Π).
Hereafter, for the sake of simplicity, we write S(A) for S(A, I1, I2).
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[P ∈ Blocked ]: in this case there is no scheduling and
Exec(P ) = {P
τ [q]
−→Q | eval(P)
q
↪→ Q}.
The sum of the probabilities of outgoing transitions of P is
p=
∑
Q∈Im(eval(P))
Prob[eval(P) = Q]
≤ 1 by deﬁnition of eval .
[P ∈ Blocked ]: in this case:
Exec(P ) = {tID = P
α[qID]
−→ Q | (α, ID) ∈ χ(P )}.
The sum of the probabilities of outgoing transitions of P according to the scheduler
S is
p=
∑
(α,ID)∈χ(P )
Prob[S(χ(P )) = (α, ID)] × qID
≤
∑
(α,ID)∈χ(P )
Prob[S(χ(P )) = (α, ID)] since ∀ID ∈ Index , qID ≤ 1
≤ 1 by deﬁnition of S.

2.4 Cumulative probability distribution
Transition systems induced by the operational semantics of Table 1 may have a
state P with several outgoing transitions labeled by the same action and the same
probability. But to correctly compute the probability of outgoing transitions of P
according to a scheduler, we must ensure that they can be uniquely identiﬁed. If
P is blocked then χ enables us to uniquely index the outgoing transitions of P . If
P is unblocked then there exists a ﬁnite number n = |Im(eval(P ))| of processes Qi
(1 ≤ i ≤ n) s.t. ∃qi =0 P
τ [qi]
−→Qi is an outgoing transition of P . We can order Qi from
1 to n and use this ordering to index outgoing transitions of P s.t. P
τ [qi]
−→Qi being
indexed by (i, i) 5 .
Let σ = (α1, id1) . . . (αn, idn) be a sequence of indexed actions. Then σ is a path
from P to Q if there exist nonzero probabilities p1, . . . , pn s.t.
P0
α1[p1]
−→ P1
α2[p2]
−→ · · ·
αn[pn]
−→ Pn,
P = P0 and Q = Pn. Similarly, we say that P reaches Q by path σ with probability
p according to S, denoted by P
σ[p]
=⇒S Q, if the probability that S chooses σ is
Prob[S(σ)] =
∏
1≤i≤n qi = p where
5 by analogy to the indexing of τ actions by χ
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qi =
⎧⎨
⎩
pi if Pi−1 ∈ Blocked
Prob[S(χ(Pi−1)) = (αi, idi)]× pi otherwise
Example 2.9 Let P be the process whose transition system in shown in Figure 1
where P1 ∈ Blocked and Prob[eval (P1) = Pi] = pi for 3 ≤ i ≤ 5. Let S be scheduler
such that
• Prob[S({(α1, 1); (α2, 2)}) = (α1, 1)] = q
• Prob[S({(α1, 1); (α2, 2)}) = (α2, 2)] = 1− q
6
• Prob[S({(α3, 1)}) = (α3, 1)] = 1 (according to the stochasticity condition).




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Fig. 1. Transition system of P
Then the probability that P reaches Q by the path σ = (α1, 1)(τ, (2, 2))(α3 , 1)
according to the scheduler S is
Prob[S(σ)] = (p1 × q)× p4 × (p6 × 1).
An α-path is a path of type (τ, id1)(τ, id2) . . . (τ, idn−1)(α, idn) (n ≥ 1). The
notation P
α[p]
=⇒S Q means that there exists an α-path σ s.t. P
σ[p]
=⇒S Q. Similarly
P
αˆ[p]
=⇒S Q denotes P
α[p]
=⇒S Q if α = τ and P
τ∗[p]
=⇒S Q otherwise.
Let E ⊆ Proc be a set of processes and Q ∈ E . Let P be a process, and σ an
α-path from P to Q. Then σ is minimal w.r.t E if no other α-path σ′ exists from
P to Q′ s.t. σ′ is a preﬁx 7 of σ and Q′ ∈ E . We denote by Paths(P,
α
=⇒,E ) the set
of all minimal α-paths from P to an element of E .
Deﬁnition 2.10 Let E ⊆ Proc be a set of processes. The cumulative probability
that P reaches a process in E by an α-path according to S is computed by the
cumulative probability function μ : Proc × Act× 2Proc × Sched → [0, 1]
μ(P,
αˆ
=⇒S , E ) =
(
1 if P ∈ E , α = τP
{Prob[S(σ)] : σ ∈ Paths(P,
α
=⇒, E )} otherwise
The next theorem follows by induction on the length of α-paths.
Theorem 2.11 The cumulative probability function is well deﬁned i.e.
∀P,α,E ,S μ(P,
αˆ
=⇒S ,E ) ≤ 1.
6 Note that if (α1, 1) and (α2, 2) are equiprobable then q = 1− q, i.e. q =
1
2
.
7 Preﬁxing does not take into account any indexing, e.g. (α1, id3) is a preﬁx of (α1, id1)(α2, id2) for all
index id1 and id3. Note also that the minimality condition applies only to τ -paths.
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3 Probabilistic behavioural equivalences
Now we plan to establish equivalences ensuring that a protocol satisﬁes a security
property if and only if it is observationally equivalent to an abstraction of the
protocol, satisfying the security property by construction. In other words we request
two processes to be equivalent if and only if, when subject to same attacks, they
generate “approximately” the same observations. By “approximately” we mean
asymptotically closed w.r.t. the security parameter 8 .
3.1 Asymptotic observational equivalence
We start by deﬁning the notion of an observable and the probability that a given
process P generates a particular observable. An observable is simply a pair (c,m) of
a public channel and a message. The set of all observables is denoted by Obs. The
probability of observing (c,m) is deﬁned as the sum of the probability of observing
it directly, i.e. the cumulative probability of executing an c(m) · c(m)-path or an
c(m) · c(m)-path to reach any state, and the probability of observing it indirectly,
i.e. by observing ﬁrst some diﬀerent visible actions before observing it. For that
purpose we extend the notion of cumulative probability to the so-called cumulative
probability up to H.
Deﬁnition 3.1 Let E ⊆ Proc be a set of processes, P a process, S a scheduler and
H ⊂ Actual \ {τ} a set of visible actions. The cumulative probability up to H is
deﬁned inductively as follows: ∀α ∈ Actual \H
μ(P,
αˆ
=⇒S/H , E ) =
8><
>:
1 if P ∈ E and α = τ,
μ(P,
αˆ
=⇒S , E )+P
β∈H, Q∈Proc μ(P,
βˆ
=⇒S , {Q})μ(Q,
αˆ
=⇒S/H , E ) otherwise
Lemma 3.2 The cumulative probability up to H is well deﬁned, i.e. ∀P,α,E , S
and H, μ(P,
αˆ
=⇒S/H ,E ) ≤ 1.
Proof. If P ∈ E and α = τ , then μ(P,
αˆ
=⇒S/H ,E ) = 1 and the result follows.
Assume that we are not in that case. Let σ = τ∗α1 · · · τ
∗αn be a path of n actual
visible actions separated by ﬁnite numbers of internal actions (we omit the index of
the actions). We say that action αi (1 ≤ i ≤ n) is at distance i from process P on
path σ according to the scheduler S, denoted dσ(P,αi, S) = i, if there exist both a
nonzero probability p, and a process Q such that P
σ[p]
=⇒S Q and ∀j < i αj = αi.
In other words, dσ(P,α, S) is the ﬁrst position of the visible action α on path σ.
Similarly, let α ∈ H be an actual visible action and
ΣH(α) = {σ = τ
∗α1τ
∗α2 · · · τ
∗αnτ
∗α | n ∈ N and ∀i ≤ n, αi ∈ H}.
Then α is at maximal distance k w.r.t H from the process P according to the
scheduler S, denoted by dH(P,α, S) = k, if supσ∈ΣH(α) dσ(P,α, S) = k. To prove
8 For veriﬁcation purpose, all along this section, we consider only actual actions (i.e. actions in Actual)
keeping in mind that partial actions are never executable. So far partial actions have been considered purely
for the sake of semantic soundness and completeness.
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the claim, we proceed by induction on dH(P,α, S). Let α ∈ Actual \ (H ∪{τ}). We
have:
[Basis] if dH(P,α, S) = 0 then
μ(P,
αˆ
=⇒S/H ,E ) = μ(P,
αˆ
=⇒S ,E ) ≤ 1.
[Inductive step] Assume that the claim holds for all Q s.t. dH(Q,α, S) < n.
Since
μ(P,
αˆ
=⇒S/H ,E ) =μ(P,
αˆ
=⇒S,E )
+
∑
β∈H, Q∈Proc
μ(P,
βˆ
=⇒S , {Q})μ(Q,
αˆ
=⇒S/H ,E )
and by induction hypothesis, μ(Q,
αˆ
=⇒S/H ,E ) ≤ 1, it remains to show that
μ(P,
αˆ
=⇒S,E ) +
∑
β∈H, Q∈Proc
μ(P,
βˆ
=⇒S , {Q}) ≤ 1,
But we have
μ(P,
αˆ
=⇒S ,E ) +
∑
β∈H, Q∈Proc
μ(P,
βˆ
=⇒S , {Q})
≤
∑
β∈H∪{α}
μ(P,
βˆ
=⇒S ,Proc)
But that sum is smaller than the sum of the probabilities of outgoing transitions
from the state P according to scheduler S, which is less than or equal to 1 according
to the Theorem 2.8. 
Deﬁnition 3.3 Let o = (c,m) be an observable and Lo = {c(m)·c(m), c(m)·c(m)}.
The cumulative probability that P generates o according to S is
Prob[P S o] =
∑
α∈Lo
μ(P,
αˆ
=⇒S/(Actual\(Lo∪{τ})),Proc).
Lemma 3.4 The cumulative probability of an observable is well deﬁned, i.e. ∀P, o,
and S, Prob[P S o] ≤ 1.
Proof. The proof is given in Appendix B. 
We deﬁne our asymptotic observational equivalence relation as stating that two
processes are equivalent if they generate the same observables with approximately
the same probabilities when they are attacked by the same enemy.
Deﬁnition 3.5 Let Poly : N → R+ be the set of positive polynomials and E =
Proc × Sched the set of attackers. Two processes P and Q are observationally
equivalent, written P  Q, iﬀ ∀q∈Poly, ∀o∈Obs , ∀(Π,S)∈E , ∃i0 s.t. ∀N≥i0
|Prob[P |ΠS o]− Prob[Q|ΠS o]| ≤
1
q(N)
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Theorem 3.6 The observational relation  is an equivalence relation.
Proof. Reﬂexivity and symmetry are obvious. For transitivity, let P , Q and R be
processes such that P  Q and Q  R. Let q be a polynomial, o an observation
and (Π, S) an attacker. Then P  Q ⇒ ∃i0 such that ∀N ≥ i0
|Prob[P |ΠS o]− Prob[Q|ΠS o]| ≤
1
2q(N)
,
and Q  R ⇒ ∃j0 such that ∀N ≥ j0
|Prob[Q|ΠS o]− Prob[R|ΠS o]| ≤
1
2q(N)
.
It follows that ∀N ≥ k0 = max(i0, j0) we have
|Prob[P |ΠS o]− Prob[R|ΠS o]|
= |Prob[P |ΠS o]−Prob[Q|ΠS o]
+Prob[Q|ΠS o]− Prob[R|ΠS o]|
≤ |Prob[P |ΠS o]−Prob[Q|ΠS o]|
+ |Prob[Q|ΠS o]− Prob[R|ΠS o]|
≤
1
2q(N)
+
1
2q(N)
=
1
q(N)
.

In order to develop methods for reasoning about security properties of crypto-
protocols based on observable traces, we reformulate the observational equivalence
to take into account any observable trace.
3.2 Trace equivalence
We start by deﬁning the cumulative probability that a process P generates a se-
quence of observables o1o2 · · · on recursively as the probability that the process di-
rectly generates o1 and reaches a state Q, times the cumulative probability that the
process Q generates the remaining sequence.
Deﬁnition 3.7 Let o1o2 · · · on be a sequence of observables s.t. ∀i ≤ n, oi = (ci,mi)
and P be a process. Let αi = ci(mi) · ci(mi) and βi = ci(mi) · ci(mi) ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n.
The cumulative probability that P generates the sequence o1o2 · · · on according to
scheduler S is
Prob[P trS o1o2 · · · on]
=
∑
Q∈Proc
(μ(P,
αˆ1=⇒S, {Q}) + μ(P,
βˆ1
=⇒S , {Q}))Prob[Q
tr
S o2 · · · on].
Lemma 3.8 The cumulative probability of observing a sequence of observables is
well deﬁned, i.e. ∀P, o1, o2, · · · , on and S, Prob[P 
tr
S o1o2 · · · on] ≤ 1.
Proof. It follows easily by induction on the length of sequences and from Lemma 3.2
and Theorem 2.8. 
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Deﬁnition 3.9 Two processes P and Q are trace equivalent, as denoted by P tr
Q, iﬀ ∀q∈Poly, ∀o1,o2,··· ,on∈Obs , ∀(Π,S)∈E , ∃i0 s.t. ∀N≥i0
|Prob[P |ΠtrS o1o2 · · · on]− Prob[Q|Π
tr
S o1o2 · · · on]| ≤
1
q(N)
Theorem 3.10 tr is an equivalence relation.
Proof. Similar to the proof of Theorem 3.6. 
To conclude this section we have the following important result that relates the
two equivalence relations.
Theorem 3.11 Trace and observational equivalences are equivalent, i.e.
∀P,Q∈ProcP 
tr Q ⇔ P  Q.
Proof. The proof is given in Appendix B. 
4 Case study: the Dining Cryptographers protocol
The Dining Cryptographers [8] protocol is a paradigmatic example of a protocol
which ensures anonymity. Its author deﬁnes it as follows:
Three cryptographers are sitting down to dinner at their favorite restaurant. Their
waiter informs them that arrangements have been made with the maitre d’hotel
for the bill to be paid anonymously. One of the cryptographers might be paying
for the dinner, or it might have been NSA (U.S. National Security Agency). The
three cryptographers respect each other’s right to make an anonymous payment,
but they wonder if NSA is paying.
To fairly resolve their uncertainty, they carry out the following protocol: each
cryptographer ﬂips a coin between himself and the cryptographer on his right, so
that only the two of them can see the outcome. Each one of them then states
whether or not the two coins he can see fell on the same side. The payer (if any!)
states the opposite of what he sees. The idea is that if the coins are unbiased and
the protocol is carried out faithfully then an odd number of “diﬀerent” indicates
that one of them is paying and neither of the other two learns anything about his
identity; otherwise NSA is paying.
4.1 A ﬂawed speciﬁcation of the protocol
In the following speciﬁcation 9 we suppose that the NSA makes his choice according
to a probabilistic distribution (known only to himself) deﬁned by the function λNSA
and informs each cryptographer over a secure channel if whether or not he is the
payer. To ensure fairness between cryptographers, i.e. no one having advantage
over another, each ﬂip of a coin is made by an “outside trusted third party” by
9 where ⊕ is the addition modulus 2.
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means of the function flips and the result is made available to both concerned
cryptographers.
NSA ::= [λNSA(3) ↪→ x](
Y
0≤i≤3
[x = i]Payeri)
Payer3 ::= c0(nopay).c1(nopay).c2(nopay).0
Payeri ::= ci(pay).ci⊕1(nopay).ci⊕2(nopay).0 if 0 ≤ i ≤ 2.
Crypts ::= [flips(coin0) ↪→ y0][flips(coin1) ↪→ y1][flips(coin2) ↪→ y2]
Y
0≤i≤2
Crypti
Crypti ::= ci(zi).([zi = pay]Pi|[zi = nopay]Qi)
Pi ::= [yi = yi⊕1]pubi(desagree).0|[yi = yi⊕1]pubi(agree).0
Qi ::= [yi = yi⊕1]pubi(agree).0|[yi = yi⊕1]pubi(desagree).0
The protocol is then speciﬁed as follows: DCP 1 ::= νc0c1c2(NSA|Crypts)
4.2 Speciﬁcation of anonymity
We give a probabilistic version of the anonymity speciﬁcation of [12] in the pos-
sibilistic model CSP. The idea is that given a set A and a set O, of anonymous
and observable events respectively, a protocol P ensures the anonymity of events A
to any observer who can see only events in O if P does not allow the observer to
determine any causal dependency between the probabilistic distributions of A and
O.
Let A and O be the sets of anonymous and observable events respectively.
Perm(A) denotes the set of permutations of the elements of A and π(P ) the process
obtained by replacing any occurrence of the event a in the process P by the event
π(a). We deﬁned formally the anonymity property as follows.
Deﬁnition 4.1 [Anonymity property] A protocol P ensures anonymity of events
A if and only if it is trace equivalent to any of its permutations (w.r.t anonymous
events), i.e.
∀π∈Perm(A)P 
tr π(P )
In the above speciﬁcation the anonymous events of the DCP protocol are ADCP =
{(ci,m) | 0 ≤ i ≤ 2 and m = pay, nopay} and the observable events are any com-
munication over a public channel. Let
Schedτ = {S ∈ Sched |
∑
(τ,i,j)∈A,i,j∈I1
Prob[S(A, I1, I2) = (τ, i, j)] = 1}
denote the subset of schedulers that give priority to internal actions of the protocol
and trτ the observational trace equivalence induced by Schedτ . Then we have the
following results which show that Sched can detect the ﬂaw in DCP 1 while Schedτ
cannot.
Theorem 4.2 With the notation above, the following conditions hold:
• ∀π∈Perm(ADCP ), if ∀i=0,1,2 Prob[flips(coini) = Head] =
1
2 then
DCP 1 trτ π(DCP
1.
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• Whatever the probabilistic distributions of the coins are, if π is not the identity
permutation then
DCP 1 tr π(DCP 1.
The ﬂaw in DCP 1 results from the fact that the real payer (if any) has an
advantage over the others since, because of the deﬁnition of the process Payeri,
he always receives the message from the NSA before them. A scheduler that gives
priority to observable actions (i.e. an intruder who attacks the protocol as soon as
possible), will only generate observable traces beginning with the public channel of
the real payer i.e. with an observable (c,m) where c denotes the public channel of
the real payer. Under such schedulers, DCP 1 and π(DCP 1) will generate diﬀer-
ent observable traces and are hence not equivalent. A correct speciﬁcation of the
protocol (DCP 2) follows
NSA ::= [λNSA(3) ↪→ x](
Y
0≤i≤3
[x = i]Payeri)
Payer3 ::= c0(nopay).c1(nopay).c2(nopay).0
Payeri ::= ci(pay).ci⊕1(nopay).ci⊕2(nopay).0 if 0 ≤ i ≤ 2.
Crypts ::= c0(z0).c1(z1).c2(z2).F lip
F lip ::= [flips(coin0) ↪→ y0][flips(coin1) ↪→ y1][flips(coin2) ↪→ y2](
Y
0≤i≤2
Crypti)
Crypti ::= [zi = pay]Pi|[zi = nopay]Qi
Pi ::= [yi = yi⊕1]pubi(different).0|[yi = yi⊕1]pubi(same).0
Qi ::= [yi = yi⊕1]pubi(same).0|[yi = yi⊕1]pubi(different).0
The protocol is then speciﬁed as follows: DCP 2 ::= νc0c1c2(NSA|Crypts). It
blocks the coins ﬂipping until all cryptographers receive their message from the NSA.
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A Probabilistic polynomial functions
The following deﬁnitions are standard: see for instance [2] (chapter 24, pp. 19-28).
Deﬁnition A.1 A probabilistic function F from X to Y is a function X × Y →
[0, 1] that satisﬁes the following conditions.
• ∀x ∈ X :
∑
y∈Y F (x, y) ≤ 1
• ∀x ∈ X, the set {y|y ∈ Y, F (x, y) > 0} is ﬁnite.
For x ∈ X and y ∈ Y , we say F (x) evaluates to y with probability p, written
Prob[F (x) = y] = p, if F (x, y) = p.
Deﬁnition A.2 The composition F = F1◦F2 : X×Z → [0, 1] of two probabilistic
functions F1 : X×Y → [0, 1] and F2 : Y ×Z → [0, 1] is the probabilistic function:
∀x ∈ X,∀z ∈ Z : F (x, z) =
∑
y∈Y
F1(x, y) · F2(y, z).
Deﬁnition A.3 An oracle Turing machine is a Turing machine with an extra oracle
tape and three extra states qquery, qyes and qno. When the machine reaches the state
qquery, control is passed either to the state qyes if the contents of the oracle tape
belongs to the oracle set, or to the state qno otherwise.
Given an oracle Turing machine M , Mσ(
−→a ) stands for the result of the appli-
cation of M to −→a by using the oracle σ.
Deﬁnition A.4 An oracle Turing machine executes in polynomial time if there
exists a polynomial q(−→x ) such that for all σ, Mσ(
−→a ) halts in time q(|−→a |), where
−→a = (a1, · · · , ak) and |
−→a | = |a1|+ · · · + |ak|.
Let M be an oracle Turing machine with execution time bounded by the poly-
nomial q(−→a ). Since M(−→a ) may call an oracle with at most q(−→a ) bits, we have a
ﬁnite set Q of oracles for which M executes in time that is bounded by q(−→a ).
Deﬁnition A.5 We say that an oracle Turing machine is probabilistic polynomial
and write Prob[M(−→a ) = b] = p the probability that M applied to −→a returns b is p,
if and only if, by choosing uniformly an oracle σ in the ﬁnite set Q, the probability
that Mσ(
−→a ) = b is p.
Deﬁnition A.6 A probabilistic function F is said to be polynomial if it is com-
putable by a probabilistic polynomial Turing machine, that is, for all input −→a and
all output b, Prob[F (−→a ) = b] = Prob[M(−→a ) = b].
B Proofs
Proof. [Lemma 3.4] Let o = (c,m) be an observable, Lo = {c(m)·c(m), c(m)·c(m)},
S a scheduler and P a process. Let H be the set H = Actual \ (Lo ∪{τ}). To prove
the lemma, we proceed by induction on dH(P,α, S) deﬁned in the above proof of
Lemma 3.2.
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• [Basis:] If ∀α∈LodH(P,α, S) = 0 then
Prob[P S o] =
∑
α∈Lo
μ(P,
αˆ
=⇒S/H ,Proc) =
∑
α∈Lo
μ(P,
αˆ
=⇒S ,Proc)
≤
∑
β∈Act
μ(P,
βˆ
=⇒S ,Proc)
≤ 1 (according to Theorem 2.8.)
• [Induction step:] Suppose that for any process Q such that ∀α∈LodH(Q,α, S) < n,
Prob[QS o] ≤ 1. Then we have
Prob[P S o] =
∑
α∈Lo
μ(P,
αˆ
=⇒S/H ,Proc)
=
∑
α∈Lo
μ(P,
αˆ
=⇒S ,Proc) +
∑
α∈Lo
∑
β∈H, Q∈Proc
μ(P,
βˆ
=⇒S , {Q})μ(Q,
αˆ
=⇒S/H ,E )
=
∑
α∈Lo
μ(P,
αˆ
=⇒S ,Proc) +
(
∑
β∈H, Q∈Proc
μ(P,
βˆ
=⇒S , {Q}))Prob[QS o]
≤
∑
α∈Lo
μ(P,
αˆ
=⇒S ,Proc) +
∑
β∈H, Q∈Proc
μ(P,
βˆ
=⇒S , {Q}) (induction hypotheses)
≤
∑
β∈Act
μ(P,
βˆ
=⇒S ,Proc)
≤ 1 (according to Theorem 2.8.)

Proof. [Theorem 3.11] (⇒). Let H ⊂ Actual \ {τ} be a set of visible actions,
o = (c,m) an observable s.t. {c(m) · c(m), c(m) · c(m)} ∩H = ∅ , S a scheduler and
R a process. Then dH(R, o, S) denotes
dH(R, o, S) = max(dH(R, c(m) · c(m), S), dH (R, c(m) · c(m), S)).
Now let O be a set of observables s.t. o ∈ O, and TrOk (R, o, S) the set
TrOk (P, o, S) = {s = o1o2 · · · oko|∀i ≤ k, oi ∈ O and Prob[R
tr
S s] = 0}.
Then for any observable o, we have
Prob[RS o] =
∑
k≥0
∑
s∈Tr
Obs\{o}
k (R,o,S)
Prob[RtrS s].
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Let P and Q be two processes s.t. P tr Q, o = (c,m) ∈ Obs , (Π, S) ∈ E ,
q ∈ Poly and
H = {α | ∃(c′,m′) ∈ Obs \ {o} and α ∈ {c′(m′) · c′(m′), c′(m′) · c′(m′)}}.
To prove the theorem, we proceed by induction on
max(dH(P |Π, o, S), dH (Q|Π, o, S)).
[Basis:] If dH(P |Π, o, S) = dH(Q|Π, o, S) = 0, then we have:
Prob[P |ΠS o] = μ(P |Π,
αˆ
=⇒S ,Proc) + μ(P |Π,
βˆ
=⇒S ,Proc)
where α = c(m) · c(m) and β = c(m) · c(m). Similarly
Prob[Q|ΠS o] = μ(Q|Π,
αˆ
=⇒S ,Proc) + μ(Q|Π,
βˆ
=⇒S,Proc).
P tr Q ⇒
|μ(P |Π,
αˆ
=⇒S ,Proc) +μ(P |Π,
βˆ
=⇒S ,Proc)
−μ(Q|Π,
αˆ
=⇒S ,Proc) + μ(Q|Π,
βˆ
=⇒S ,Proc)| ≤
1
q(N)
Hence
|Prob[P |ΠS o]− Prob[Q|ΠS o]| ≤
1
q(N)
[Induction step:] assume that max(dH(P |Π, o, S), dH (Q|Π, o, S) = n, and ∀q∈Poly
we have
∑
k<n
∑
s∈Tr
Obs\{o}
k (R,o,S)
|Prob[P |ΠtrS s]− Prob[Q|Π
tr
S s]| ≤
1
2q(N)
.
Now set Uk = Tr
H
k (P |Π, o, S) ∪ Tr
H
k (Q|Π, o, S), then we have
|Prob[P |ΠS o]−Prob[Q|ΠS o]|
= |
∑
k≤n
∑
s∈Uk
(Prob[P |ΠtrS s]− Prob[Q|Π
tr
S s])|
≤ |
∑
k<n
∑
s∈Uk
Prob[P |ΠtrS s]− Prob[Q|Π
tr
S s]|
+
∑
s∈Un
|Prob[P |ΠtrS s]− Prob[Q|Π
tr
S s]|
By induction hypothesis we have
|
∑
k<n
∑
s∈Uk
Prob[P |ΠtrS s]− Prob[Q|Π
tr
S s]| ≤
1
2q(N)
.
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Set rn = |Tr
H
n (P |Π, o, S)| + |Tr
H
n (Q|Π, o, S)|. P 
tr Q ⇒ ∀s ∈ Un
|Prob[P |ΠtrS s]− Prob[Q|Π
tr
S s]| ≤
1
rn · 2q(N)
,
then
∑
s∈Un
|Prob[P |ΠtrS s]− Prob[Q|Π
tr
S s]| ≤
rn
rn · 2q(N)
=
1
2q(N)
.
Hence we have
|Prob[P |ΠS o]− Prob[P |ΠS o]| ≤
1
2q(N)
+
1
2q(N)
≤
1
q(N)
.
(⇐). Suppose now that P  Q but P tr Q. Then we will show that we
reach a contradiction. Indeed, if P tr Q, then there exists an attacker (Π, S), an
observable trace o1o2 · · · on and a polynomial q s.t.
∀N |Prob[P |Π
tr
S o1o2 · · · on]− Prob[Q|Π
tr
S o1o2 · · · on]| >
1
q(N)
.
Let o′ = (c′,m) s.t. c′ is neither a channel of P or Q nor a channel of Π and
let (Π′, S′) be the attacker who behaves exactly like (Π, S) exept that anytime he
observes the trace o1o2 · · · on he makes the observable o
′ with probability 1. Then
we have
|Prob[P |Π′′S o
′]− Prob[Q|Π′ ′S o
′]|
= |Prob[P |ΠtrS o1o2 · · · ono
′]− Prob[Q|ΠtrS o1o2 · · · ono
′]|
Hence P  Q which contradicts our hypothesis. 
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